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Abstract
In this paper, we examine how uncertainty can a¤ect successive mar-
kets, when uncertainty can jointly inuence both the upstream and down-
stream marketsconditions. The main result of the paper is that the equi-
librium input and output quantities under stochastic dependence can be
higher or lower than the corresponding quantities in the case of certainty
equivalence depending on how much dependent are the events.
JEL classication: L1, L120
1 Introduction
In this paper, we examine how uncertainty can a¤ect successive markets, when
uncertainty can jointly inuence both the upstream and downstream markets
conditions. Generally, shocks a¤ecting the economic environment inuence si-
multaneously most markets in the same chain of value, and not each of them
separately. Yet, to the best of our knowledge, most existing studies in microeco-
nomics, consider that uncertainty a¤ects just one market in isolation (Sandmo
1971, Leland 1972, Sheshinski and Dreze 1976, Gabszewicz and Poddar 1997,
Grimm and Zoettl 2006, among others), excluding thereby that the spillovers
resulting from uncertainty might be transfered from market to market in the
same chain1 . These spillovers follow from the technological linkage between
rms producing the input and those using this input in their own production
process.
We are grateful to Jacques Dreze and Diletta Salvetti for their very useful comments and
support.
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1These frequent and, quite often, unpredictable shocks can a¤ect not only a sector but
even the economy as a whole. Of course, the study of this more general case would require a
general equilibrium approach.
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An example of the chain e¤ects which can occur when uncertainty a¤ects
more than one market is provided by a consumption product the demand of
which would be high, whatever the price, when the weather is good and low in
the opposite case. Moreover, assume that simultaneously, the resource needed
to produce that good would be scarse if weather is bad, and abundant in the
opposite case. Then good weather simultaneously leads to high output demand
function and abundant resources so that restricting the analysis to the down-
stream market only, does not take into account the e¤ect of weather on the
upstream market.
We analyse uncertainty in successive markets using a microeconomic set up.
To this end, we rst introduce a simple model to describe how a downstream
rm and an upstream rm interact in a deterministic environment. Then, we
introduce uncertainty on output demand function in the downstream market
and, as a consequence, on the demand function for input in the upstream mar-
ket. Furthermore, we assume that the cost function for producing the input is
also uncertain. We consider two cases: stochastic independence and stochastic
dependence.
We nd that if shocks a¤ecting di¤erent markets are dependent, the equi-
librium quantity in both downstream and upstream markets under stochastic
dependence, is higher or smaller than the equilibrium quantity under certainty
equivalence (or stochastic independence) according to the degree of stochastic
dependence between the two random variables, namely output demand function
and input cost function.
The e¤ect of uncertainty on output demand has been extensively questioned
in the existing literature. It is shown in a number of papers (e.g. Sandmo,
1971, Leland, 1972) that rms attitude to bear the inherent risk of production
has important e¤ects on the rms willingness to produce, i.e. on its choice of
optimal level of production. Uncertainty places a crucial on the protability of
entry of new rms in a market and on how much capacity to built to deter entry
by the incumbent rms (Gabszewicz and Poddar, 1997). Sheshinski and Dreze
(1976) analyse uncertainty on output demand in a single commodity competitive
market and zero price elasticity demand. These authors nd that free entry and
competition may lead to excess capacity on the average and that the price is
lower than the minimum average cost.
2 The model
Consider a monopoly rm who faces an uncertain output demand function p(q);
twice di¤erentiable with p0(q) < 0 and p00(q) < 0, which is
p(q) =

p+(q) with probability 
p (q) with probability 1  
with  denoting the probability of getting a high demand function. We assume
that p+(q) = p(q) + ; while p (q) = p(q)   ;  > 0; p(q)     0; 8q: Thus,
the output demand function p(q) is a random variable with two values. The
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downstream monopoly uses the input z to produce the output using a linear
technology f(z) = z,  > 0. This input z is produced by a monopoly upstream
rm in the upstream market with cost function c(z); with c0(z) > 0; c"(z) < 0;
given by
c(z) =

c+(z) with probability 
c (z) with probability 1  :
where, for 8z; c+(z) > c (z): Thus, the input cost function c(z) is a random
variable with two values. It follows that the set of possible states of nature
reduces to four elements, namely:
a- both the output demand function and the cost function of producing input
are high;
b- the output demand function is high and the cost function of producing
input is low;
c- the output demand function is low and the cost function of producing
input is high;
d - both the output demand function and the cost function of producing
input are low.
3 Certainty equivalent
In the certainty equivalent scenario, output demand is deterministic and equal to
its actuarial value, namely E(p(q)) = p+(q)+(1 )p (q) = p(q)  (1  2) :
Denote by r the input price: Thus, the prot of the downstream monopolist in
this case is equal to
(r; q) = (p(q)   (1  2)) q   r

q; (1)
The rst order condition of the downstream monopolist writes as:
dp(q)
dq
q + p(q)   (1  2)  r

= 0 (2)
Taking into account technology, (2) can be reexpressed as the input demand
r(z); namely
r(z) =

dp(z)
d(z)
z + p(z)   (1  2)

: (3)
The prot  (z) of the upstream rm writes as
 (z) = r(z)z   c(z):
Consequently, we can obtain the input supply function s(z); from the rst order
condition:
r(z) + r0(z)z   c0(z) = 0:
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Applying the input market clearing condition, it follows that r(z) = s(z);
where z is the equilibrium input quantity. Accordingly, the prot of the up-
stream monopolist writes as
 (z) =

dp(z)
d(z)
z + p(z)   (1  2)

z    c+(z) + (1  )c (z)
We make the simplifying assumption that c+
0
(z) = c 0(z) = c0(z); it follows
that the rst order condition writes as
d2p(z)
d(z)2
2z + 2
dp(z)
d(z)


z+
+

dp(z)
d(z)
z + (p(z)   (1  2))

  c0(z) = 0;
while the second order condition obtains as

d3p(z)
d(z)3
3z + 3
d2p(z)
d(z)2
2

z +

d2p(z)
d(z)2
2z + 2
dp(z)
d(z)


  c00(z):
Since c"(z) < 0; the prot of the upstream monopolist is concave if the demand
for input faced by this rm is concave. Furthermore, concavity of input demand
obtains from the following condition on output demand :
d3p(q)
dq3
q + 2
d2p(q)
dq2

< 0 (4)
Consequently, when (4) holds, the solution given by the FOC exists and is in-
terior. For instance, the condition (4) is satised in the following example.
Consider a monopoly rm who faces a demand for its output which can be
p(q) = 1 +   q3 with probability  and 1    q3 with probability 1 . This
monopoly uses the technology f(z) = z: Maximising the prot (q) in the cer-
tainty equivalent case, (q) =
 
((1  q3 + ) + (1  )(1  q3   ))q   rq ;
we obtain q(r) = z(r) = 3
q
1
4 ( (2   1) + (1  r)): The upstream monopo-
list faces the above input demand and a linear stochastic production cost c(z),
equal to +z with probability  and  z with probability 1   : Taking into
account the equality of demand and supply, i.e. r(z) = s(z), in the upstream
market, we get r(z) =  (2   1)  4z3 + 1. Accordingly, the prot function of
the upstream monopolist writes as  (z) =
 
2      4z3 + 1 z z; with  =
++(1 ) : It is checked that condition (4) holds. Taking the FOC leads to
z = 3
q
1
16 (2       + 1): Substituting z in r, we obtain r =  3+6+34 :
Finally, substituting r into q(r); we obtain q = 3
q
1
16 (2       + 1) and
p = + 2+1516 :
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4 Uncertainty
Assume now that both the downstream and the upstream rms know the dis-
tribution probability on output demand. Furthermore assume that the down-
stream rm behaves as a price taker in the input market. In other words, we
assume that the upstream rm is aware of the e¤ect of uncertainty on output
demand, while the downstream rm ignores the e¤ect of this uncertainty on the
input price2 . Finally, the upstream rm is assumed to know the probability
distribution of its own production cost function.
We consider now the consequences of this uncertain emvironment on the
market solution in two di¤erent scenarios: stochastic independent, and stochas-
tic dependent, events.
4.1 Stochastic independence
Under stochastic independence, the states of nature a, b, c and d occur with
probability ; (1 ); (1 ); (1 )(1 ); respectively:The expected prots
of the downstream monopolist now obtains as
E(q; r) = 

p+(q)q   q r


+ (1  )(p+(q)q   q r

) +
+(1  )

p (q)q   q r


+ (1  )(1  )

p (q)q   q r


;
which can be rewritten as
E(q; r) =
h
qp+(q)  (1  ) q

r
i
+
h
(1  ) qpl(q)   q

r
i
: (5)
Comparing the objective functions (1) and (5), we see that the output quantities
maximizing prots of the downstream monopolist coincide in both cases.
Since the objective function of the downstream monopolist under stochas-
tic independence is the same as in the case of certainty equivalent, the input
demand is also the same in both cases. Therefore, the objective function for
the upstream monopoly under stochastic independence is also the same as in
the certainty equivalent scenario. Hence, the market solution under independent
stochastic uncertainty coincides with the market solution which appears in the
case of certainty equivalence.
4.2 Stochastic dependence
Consider now the case of stochastic dependence. We keep the assumption that
the downstream rm does not know the e¤ect of uncertainty on the input price
and, accordingly, takes the input price as given whatever the state. Further-
more, for sake of simplicity, we assume that Pr(high output demand p low input
2This assumption is in the spirit of the traditional framework of successive markets where
it is assumed that the downstream rm(s) take the input price as given (Salinger 1988, Gaudet
and Von Long 1996...).
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marginal cost ) = Pr(low output demand p high input marginal cost ) = : Hence
the states of nature a, b, c and d now occur each with probabiliies
a : Pr (high output demand \ low input marginal cost ) = (1  );
b : Pr (low output demand \ low input marginal cost ) = (1  ) (1  );
c : Pr (low output demand \ high input marginal cost ) = ;
d : Pr (high output demand \ high input marginal cost) = (1  ) :
Then, the expected prot function of the downstream rm writes as
E(q; r) =
 
p+(q) ( (1  2) + ) + p (q) (1  ( (1  2) + )) q   q

r:
Dene  as the probability to have a high output demand function under sto-
chastic dependence, namely  =  (1  2) + ; with 0   (1  2) +   1; or

1 2  : Then the expected prot obtains as
E(q; r) =
 
p+(q) + p (q) (1  ) q   q

r: (6)
Since the objective function (??) is the same as (5), except that the probability
of high demand is now given by  and the probability of low demand is 1   ;
the input demand is similar to the input demand under stochastic independence
with these corresponding probabilities. Hence, following the same procedure as
in the case of certainty equivalent case, we obtain the market solution from the
rst order condition of (6) :
d2p(z)
d(z)2
2z + 2
dp(z)
d(z)


z+
+

dp(z)
d(z)
z + (p(z)   (1  2))

  c0(z) = 0:
Thus, we obtain the following:
Proposition 1 The output and input quantities produced at equilibrium under
stochastic dependence are respectively higher equal or lower than the quantities
produced under certainty equivalence (or stochastic independence), if and only if
the probability  of a high output demand function, under certainty equivalence,
is higher, equal or lower, than the corresponding probability  under stochastic
dependence.
Notice that @@ 7 0 i¤  ?
1
2 : Thus, the probability of having a high output
demand function (resp. output quantity) increases with the probability of high
input cost function (resp. input quantity), when the probability of high output
demand conditional on low input marginal cost does not exceed 12 .
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As for the prices, both the output and input prices under stochastic de-
pendence can be either higher equal or lower than the price under certainty
equivalence (or stochastic independence). Of course, if  is higher than ; then
the demand functions both in the downstream and upstream markets shift up-
wards. However, the intersection with the quantity chosen by the monopolist in
its own market does not allow to conclude about the sign of the change in the
corresponding price.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we examine how uncertainty can a¤ect successive markets, when
uncertainty can jointly inuence both the upstream and downstream markets
conditions. Our main interest is to analyse the e¤ect of uncertainty on the pro-
duction choice of the upstream and the dowstream rm, when uncertainty in
each market originates from stochastic independent and/or dependent events.
The contribution of this paper to the existing literature is twofold. We provide a
microeconomic founded framework to deal with uncertainty in di¤erent markets
which constitute a value chain, and secondly, we show how the combined uncer-
tainty a¤ects the production choice. A natural extension of the present paper
would be to analyse successive oligopolies and thus consequence of uncertainty
on the protability of vertical integration and horizontal mergers.
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